Essays

The hostile powers only use their fragile ceasefires to prepare for another round of war — so perhaps it is better to let them slug it out until they are more willing to compromise with each other. In any case the human cost of an artificially imposed peace is much greater than that of a short war.

These are radical ideas, and rooted, quite predictably, in the West's recent Balkan experience. But post-Kargil and post-Atlantique, these become quite relevant to the situation in the subcontinent. Irrespective of whether the two countries are now able to contain the post-Atlantique fallout or let things drift into greater escalation, questions will inevitably be asked if the fire that began at Kargil was put out too prematurely. Did it leave the basic conflict and warlike mood simmering dangerously, and, therefore, only delayed the inevitable? Implicit in these doubts is the view that the West, particularly the US, played a vital role in de-escalating Kargil. But it underestimated the fires that burn within the region.

It is an interesting thought, also a little bit belittling for both India and Pakistan. The leaderships of the two countries have to weigh the current situation against this argument. Both will come under extreme pressure over the next 48 hours or so. Pakistan, from the radicals clamouring for retribution, from religiously driven generals, current and former, who believe this time is as good as any for a final war against India, and of course the fundamentalist rabble. In India, the schools that argue that the Pakistanis haven't learnt their lessons yet and it is better to have one real dust-up rather than bleed slowly in Kashmir and elsewhere will once again come out of the woodwork where the swift, almost anticlimactic resolution of Kargil had consigned them.

This will become difficult to control if the Pakistanis retaliate directly for the loss of the Atlantique. The key may be the way we look at the Kargil disengagement. Was it primarily, if not only, because of US intervention? Or was it because India and Pakistan had made up their minds anyway and were desperately searching for a diplomatic framework for mutually acceptable disengagement? The Americans provided that, mainly in the form of Clinton's 'personal interest' face-saver from Nawaz Sharif. The Pakistanis, for their own domestic reasons, would prefer to give Clinton the entire credit.

Foreign intervention for them means internationalisation and they needed at least that much to write home about after the Kargil failure. But Nawaz Sharif claimed repeatedly that he brought the region back from the brink of nuclear war. He has said that right through the conflict he kept in direct, personal touch with Vajpayee.

Both sides acknowledge the decisive role played by active, even productive, back-channel diplomacy. These are not elements that point to the inevitability of war. In fact, when the dust settles and more accurate accounts of the Kargil diplomacy are put together, it may appear that through direct and back channel contacts the two countries had already worked out a framework of disengagement. Washington's help, by way of offering Nawaz a face-saver and perhaps some persuasion with his generals, made a difference. But the fundamental impulse for the Kargil disengagement came from within. That is a lot different from the idea of the West intervening and forcing a premature end to a war.

War or a warlike situation is nothing new for India and Pakistan. We also have the experience of dealing with varying outcomes of our wars. The first one led to a UN Security Council ceasefire and settlement that still blights us. The second, in 1965, was a stalemate that left both of us very fatigued, short on ammunition as well as the will to carry on fighting without a clear purpose, and solved nothing. The captured territories and prisoners were exchanged and both countries resumed preparing for a more decisive war. Which is what 1971 was. It brought a decisive victory for India, broke up Pakistan and has not yet bought durable peace for us. For nearly a decade now we have lived in a warlike situation.

In a nuclearised environment it is difficult to see anybody winning a decisive victory in a large war. Fatigue, attrition, truce and talks are the most likely outcome of even another all-out war. Through their surprisingly mature handling of the Kargil crisis, the leaderships of both countries have demonstrated in the past few months that they understand this. Would they now let things slip out of their hands, allow escalation against their better judgment? Or will they come to the conclusion that their countries are fatigued of fighting anyway, that they do not need another war in the search for the post-war reasonableness?

Both leaderships also know that since the post-Kargil de-escalation was still far from complete such incidents were waiting to happen. With security forces on both sides eyeball-to-eyeball in a hair- trigger situation, an incident such as this has to be seen in correct perspective. If the two leaderships really want to avoid war, once this round of rhetoric passes, they should get down to this task of larger de-escalation along the entire border.